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Abstract 
Correlative evidence suggests that testosterone promotes dominance and aggression. 
However, causal evidence is scarce and offers mixed results. To investigate this 
relationship, we administered testosterone for 48h to 41 healthy young adult men in a 
within-subjects, double-blind placebo-controlled balanced crossover design. Subjects 
played the role of responders in an ultimatum game, where rejecting a low offer is 
costly, but serves to destroy the proposer’s profit. Such action can hence be interpreted 
as non-physical aggression in response to social provocation. In addition, subjects 
completed a self-assessed mood questionnaire. As expected, self-reported 
aggressiveness was a key predictor of ultimatum game rejections. However, while 
testosterone affected subjective ratings of feeling energetic and interested, our evidence 
strongly suggests that testosterone had no effect on ultimatum game rejections or on 
aggressive mood. Our findings illustrate the importance of using causal interventions to 
assess correlative evidence. 
 
Keywords 
 
Sex hormones, aggression, dominance, bargaining, neuroeconomics. 
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Introduction 
In social groups, status hierarchies can determine access to key resources such as food, 
mates and territory (Saposky, 2005). Competition for status can therefore become 
intense and often involves aggressive challenges (Smith, 1973). Biological research 
points to the key role played by the hormone testosterone (T) in such interactions. For 
instance, a large literature indicates a positive relationship between T and aggressive or 
status-seeking behavior in animals (Hirschenhauser and Oliveira, 2006; Eisenegger et al, 
2011). Although interspecies variation is large, animal studies have found a positive 
effect of exogenous T on male aggressive behavior in several species of reptiles, fish, 
birds and mammals (Hirschenhauser and Oliveira, 2006).  
 
In contrast, the relationship between T and aggression or dominance in humans remains 
controversial despite the large body of research in this area (Archer, 1991, 2006; Mazur 
and Booth, 1998; Book et al, 2001; Eisenegger et al, 2011; van Honk et al, 2014). There 
are several important challenges to our understanding of the effects of T on dominance 
and aggression in humans. Firstly, there are very few studies involving direct 
manipulation of T in men (Kouri et al, 1995; Pope et al, 2000; O’Connor et al, 2004; Zak 
et al, 2009; Welling et al, 2016; Carré et al, 2016). Evidence from studies in humans is 
largely correlational, and, therefore, severely limited when it comes to assessing causal 
relationships. Secondly, the complex and multifaceted nature of human dominance and 
aggression makes their operationalization more difficult than in other animals 
(Eisenegger et al, 2011). Thirdly, due to practical and ethical difficulties in measuring 
actual aggressive behavior in human experiments, researchers have often relied on self-
reports rather than on the measurement of actual behavior (Archer, 1991; Mazur and 
Booth, 1998). 
 
In human societies, status hierarchies and dominance struggles often take place in the 
economic domain. In this vein, behavioral economists have become increasingly 
interested in the role of T in economic decision-making (Coates et al, 2010; Brañas-
Garza and Rustichini, 2011). For instance, it has been suggested that T might be an 
important biological determinant of gender differences in negotiation, competition and 
risk-taking (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Marianne, 2011). Indeed, T has been shown to be 
significantly correlated with financial risk-taking (Apicella et al, 2008, 2014, 2015; 
Sapienza et al, 2009; Stanton et al, 2011), willingness to compete (Mehta and Josephs, 
2006; Carré and McCormick, 2008) and with the likelihood of pursuing a career in 
finance (Sapienza et al, 2009), whereas lower second-to-fourth digit ratios (2D4D) - a 
postulated indicator of high prenatal androgens (Manning et al, 1998) – has been found 
to predict long-term profits in professional traders (Coates et al, 2009). As with 
dominance and aggression, however, the evidence relating T to risk-taking and 
competition is far from conclusive. For instance, Apicella et al (2008) find a positive 
correlation between T and risk-taking in men, but Sapienza et al (2009) find that such 
correlation is only present in women, and Stanton et al (2011) observe a U-shaped 
relationship whereby both low and high T individuals exhibit greater risk taking. 
Similarly, whereas Mehta and Josephs (2006) and Carré and McCormick (2008) found 
that endogenously elevated T in men correlated with increased competitiveness, 
Apicella et al (2011) found no correlation between competitiveness and men’s basal T 
and Mehta and Josephs (2010) found this correlation only to be present in men with low 
cortisol. Finally, Schipper (2015) found no relationship between men’s or women’s basal 
T and competitive bidding, a measure sensitive both to risk preferences and willingness 
to compete.  
 
There are very few studies investigating the effects of exogenous manipulations of T on 
economic behavior, and most have focused on female, rather than male behavior 
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(Zethraeus et al, 2009; Bos et al, 2010; Eisenegger et al, 2010; van Honk et al, 2012; 
Boksem et al, 2013). Some exceptions of recent work involving T administration in 
healthy men include Zak et al (2009), who report suggestive evidence that it decreased 
generosity,1 Wibral et al (2012) who found that it reduced lying, Carré et al (2015) who 
showed that it impaired socio-cognitive ability only in subjects with low 2D4D or low 
psychopathic traits, Cueva et al (2015) who found that it increased risk-taking in an 
investment task, and Carré et al (2016) who found that it led to greater aggression only 
in subjects scoring high in trait dominance or low in trait self-control. 
 
Given the mixed results offered by correlational studies and the relative scarcity of 
experiments involving drug manipulations, it is particularly important to assess the 
robustness and replicability of current findings. This issue has been highlighted by 
recent large replication attempts in psychology and experimental economics (Open 
Science Collaboration, 2015; Camerer et al, 2016) as well as by recent critical reviews of 
oxytocin research on humans (Nave et al, 2015; Lane et al, 2016). 
 
In this study, we use a classic experimental paradigm from behavioral economics to test 
the effect of T administration on aggressive bargaining behavior in men.  Participants 
received placebo or T for 48h and, after completing a self-assessed mood questionnaire, 
played the role of responders in an ultimatum game. Subjects in this study also took part 
in a financial risk-taking task reported elsewhere (Cueva et al, 2015). 
 
The ultimatum game is among the most widely used experimental paradigms on 
bargaining in humans (Güth et al, 1982; Güth and Kocher, 2014) and, more recently, in 
nonhuman primates (Jensen et al, 2007; Proctor et al, 2013). It involves two players 
deciding how to split a given monetary endowment. In the first stage of the game, player 
1 – the proposer – sends an offer to player 2 – the responder – on how to split the 
endowment. In the second stage, the responder decides whether to accept or reject the 
offer. If the offer is accepted, each player receives the payment specified by the 
proposer’s offer and the game ends. If the offer is rejected, both players receive nothing 
and the game ends.  
 
The standard game theoretical prediction assuming profit maximization is that player 1 
offers the smallest possible positive amount to player 2, who accepts. However, a vast 
body of evidence indicates that human beings seldom behave in this way when playing 
the ultimatum game (Güth and Kocher, 2014). Instead, players often agree on an even 
split of the endowment. Less generous offers are frequently rejected, indicating that 
many responders are willing to punish offers favoring the proposer even when it is 
financially costly to do so. Economists have developed various models to accommodate 
these findings, for instance by incorporating inequality aversion or fairness 
considerations into decision-makers’ preferences (Fair and Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 
1993). However, ultimatum rejections have also been interpreted as a way in which 
individuals express anger (Xiao and Houser, 2005) and as non-physical aggression in 
response to social challenge (Burnham, 2007; Mehta and Beer, 2010).  
 
A popular alternative measure in studies of aggression in humans is the Point 
Subtraction Aggression Paradigm (PSAP) (Pope et al, 2000; Carré and McCormick, 2008; 
Carré et al, 2009, 2013, 2016). In this task, subjects can sacrifice their own points in 
order to reduce the points of an opponent who has previously stolen points from them. 
The PSAP is in fact implemented as a repeated interaction against a rigged computer 
program. This makes its interpretation less transparent than the ultimatum game in at 
                                                        
1 Their primary statistical analysis ignores the repeated-measures structure of their data and 
hence seriously overestimates the significance of their results. 
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least two ways: firstly, a repeated interaction implies that actions may be motivated by 
strategic considerations and not simply by an individual’s aggressiveness; secondly, 
debriefing questionnaires reveal that participants in the PSAP often suspect that the 
task involves deception. 
 
Our experiment focuses on responder behavior in the ultimatum game. According to the 
challenge hypothesis, T promotes aggression in males facing situations involving social 
challenge, such as competing for mates, resources or social status (Archer, 2006). Based 
on this view, our hypothesis is that, in men, T administration should induce more 
frequent rejections of low offers in the ultimatum game. We also investigated the 
relationship between self-reported aggressiveness and rejections of low offers, to see 
whether these measures were indeed related and mutually affected by T. 
 
Methods 
 
Subjects 
 
All participants provided written consent to participate as approved by the Cambridge 
University Human Biology Research Ethics Committee. A total of 41 healthy males were 
recruited for the study. Three did not complete both testing sessions, resulting in a total 
usable sample size of 38 (mean age = 22.4 y; SD = 2.97). Participants were recruited on 
campus at the University of Cambridge via volunteer lists and online advertisements. To 
minimize the risks of possible interactions with the administration of T, a qualified 
clinician carried out all screening procedures, recording standard measures (blood 
pressure, height, and weight) and remained available throughout the experiment for 
medical support. Exclusion criteria included significant medical or psychiatric illness, 
endocrine or hormone disorders, smoking or recreational drug use.  
 
Experimental Procedure and Drug Administration 
 
The experiment was a within-subjects, double-blind placebo-controlled balanced 
crossover design. All procedures were carried out individually with each participant. 
Testing was divided into two blocks taking place at least one week apart. Each block 
involved two visits to the experimental laboratory at the University of Cambridge. 
Subjects were instructed not to eat or drink 30 minutes before each visit. In the first 
visit, all screening procedures were carried out and a baseline saliva sample was 
obtained. Participants were then instructed and observed applying 10g of Testogel™ 
(1% T gel) or a placebo of colorless hydroalcoholic gel to their shoulders and upper 
back, following the Testogel™ instructions. They were given a second dose of the same 
gel to be self-administered in 24 hours. Participants returned for testing 48 hours later 
and were administered a third dose of the same gel.  Each participant therefore received 
a total of three doses of T or placebo prior to each experimental session. Additional 
saliva samples were collected when participants returned for the experimental session 
prior to the third administered dose and after participating in the behavioral tasks. In 
order to minimize differences in endogenous hormone levels due to diurnal variation, 
both experimental sessions were conducted at the same time of the day for each 
subject.2 The participants did not report any side effects following the administration 
procedure and did not perform significantly better than chance when asked to guess in 
which session they received T (p = 0.618, two-sided binomial test). Behavioral testing 
took place after the third dose of T or placebo, between 48h and 50h after the first dose. 
                                                        
2 Due to unforeseen circumstances one subject was tested in the morning one week and in the 
afternoon the other week. 
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Subjects carried out two other unrelated tasks. One of these tasks revealed a significant 
effect of T administration on financial risk-taking (Cueva et al, 2015). 
 
Although the timescale of the behavioral effects of T administration has been well 
described in women, there is currently comparatively little data on when the behavioral 
effects are maximal in males (Bos et al, 2012). We therefore employed an administration 
procedure which would result in a sustained T increase over a 48 hour period prior to 
testing in order to increase the likelihood that behavioral effects would be manifested 
within the time window of our experimental session. Recent studies have demonstrated 
that a transdermal administration significantly elevates testosterone following a single 
dose, although the timescale for measurable changes in behavior is not well described 
(Eisenegger et al, 2013; Thieme et al, 2013).  
 
Salivary T Analysis 
 
Saliva specimens of 3ml were collected by passive drool using 12ml plastic reagent 
tubes (Sarstedt, UK) and immediately frozen at -80oC. Samples were analyzed at 
the Salimetrics Centre of Excellence saliva laboratory in Cambridge (Salimetrics Europe) 
using a competitive immunoassay. Each assay was performed in duplicate, with inter- 
and intra-assay variations <6%. Of the total number of samples collected, ~7% were 
excluded or could not be analyzed due to either insufficient saliva volume or likely 
interference with the assay. In addition to this, 18% of our samples displayed T 
concentrations exceeding the upper concentration limit of our assay (6000pg/mL). 
Evidence from recent studies employing a similar topical T administration procedure 
have reported up to 100-fold increases in salivary T, demonstrating that this approach 
induces levels of circulating unbound T which can commonly exceed the range of 
standard assays (Schönfelder et al, 2011; Thieme et al, 2013). In these cases, we 
followed the approach of Schönfelder et al (2011) and set the values of these samples to 
6000pg/mL. Our salivary analysis may therefore underestimate the precise magnitude 
of the induced increases in salivary T for some subjects. 
 
Mood Measurement 
 
Before participating in the ultimatum game and after receiving the third dose of T or 
placebo, subjects’ mood was assessed using a Visual Analogue Scale (Norris, 1971). This 
mood scale contains a total of 16 dimensions: alert --- drowsy, calm --- excited, strong --- 
feeble, muzzy --- clear-headed, well-coordinated --- clumsy, lazy --- energetic, contented 
--- discontented, troubled --- tranquil, mentally slow --- quick-witted, tense --- relaxed, 
attentive --- dreamy, incompetent --- proficient, happy --- sad, aggressive --- friendly, 
interested --- bored, withdrawn --- outgoing. 
 
Ultimatum Game 
 
Proposers were recruited separately online from student lists at the University of 
Cambridge and did not receive T. Those who agreed to participate were asked to fill in a 
document and email it back before the experimental session. The document consisted of 
one page with simple instructions about the task and a list of possible offers from which 
they needed to tick one. The bottom of the page was reserved for the responders in the 
T administration experiment to circle their decision (accept or reject). This document 
was then printed out and put in an envelope. In the experimental session, participants 
read a similar set of instructions, this time detailing their role as responders and 
explaining how the offers were collected and how their responses would be 
communicated to the proposers (see supplementary information). The experimenter 
then handed an envelope with an offer, the participant circled his decision as responder 
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on that same sheet, put it back in the envelope and returned the envelope to the 
experimenter. This was repeated four times with four different offers, so each subject 
responded to four offers in each treatment. The four offers selected in each treatment 
were selected at random, but always ensuring that there was at least one 2GBP offer3. At 
the end of the experiment, one offer was randomly selected for each session and both 
proposer and responder were paid privately according to the particular outcome of that 
game. 
 
Statistical Methods 
 
Since our experiment employs a within-subjects design, our primary analysis is 
performed on paired data. The key advantage of this approach is that it allows us to 
factor out time-invariant individual heterogeneity. We report appropriate effect size 
estimations of each statistical test: Cohen’s d for pairwise comparisons of continuous 
data, odds ratios for dichotomous data, 2 for ANOVA, and partial 2 and R2 for 
regressions. Further details on the statistical analysis are provided in the results section. 
 
Results 
 
Salivary hormone analysis  
 
As illustrated in Fig. 1a, salivary T levels were significantly elevated after 48h of T 
treatment compared to placebo. In order to adjust for the non-normality of the data, T 
levels are subsequently log-transformed for the statistical analysis. Using a repeated-
measures ANOVA (F(37, 152) = 6.80, p < 0.0001, 2 = 0.95), we found a significant time 
effect (F(2,74) = 99.30; p < 0.0001, 2 = 0.73), drug effect (F(1,36) = 186.57; p < 0.0001, 
2 = 0.84) and drug-time interaction effect (F(2,59) = 90.68; p < 0.0001, 2 = 0.75). On 
average, there was a 10-fold increase in salivary T levels in the treatment condition 
compared to placebo.4 Post hoc t-tests show no significant time effect under placebo (0h 
vs 48h: t(30) = 0.82, p = 0.4; 48h vs 50h: t(31) = 1.77, p = 0.08); a significant time effect 
under treatment (0h vs 48h: t(35) = 11.87, p < 0.0001, Cohen’s d = 1.98; 48h vs 50h: 
t(36) = 5.43, p < 0.0001, d = 0.89); and a significant treatment effect 48h and 50h after 
administration (48h: t(33) = 11.01, p < 0.0001, d = 1.89; 50h: t(32) = 16.36, p = 0.0001, d 
= 2.86). We also found a significant treatment effect at 0h (t(30) = 3.70, p = 0.001, d = 
0.66), suggesting that the washout period of one week may have been insufficient to 
fully restore T levels back to baseline. Indeed, under placebo, subjects in the T-then-
placebo condition had significantly higher T levels than subjects in the placebo-then-T 
condition prior to behavioral testing (0h: t(30) = 2.47, p = 0.02,  d = 0.88; 48h: t(33) = 
3.55, p = 0.001, d = 1.20).  
 
In spite of the possibly insufficient washout, T levels before behavioral testing (48h) for 
subjects in the T-then-placebo group were still significantly higher in the T condition 
than in the placebo condition (t(15) = 6.87, p < 0.0001, d = 1.73). This difference was not 
significantly larger for subjects in the placebo-then-T group (difference-in-differences 
t(32) = 1.18, p = 0.2). In any case, we control for the possibility of a behavioral effect of 
insufficient washout, by employing an additional difference-in-differences analysis 
when estimating behavioral effects (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). 
 
                                                        
3 Due to a temporary shortage of 2GBP offers, there was one subject who did not receive any 
such offers in one of the sessions. 
4 This does not imply supraphysological T levels in blood. As shown in Thieme et al (2013) T gel 
administration results in very large short-run increases in salivary T but only moderate 
elevations of T in blood.  
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Ultimatum behavior  
 
Proposers, who were recruited separately and did not receive T, were endowed with 
10GBP and could offer 0, 2, 5, 8 or 10 to the responder. As expected, choices were highly 
clustered in either an even split or an offer to keep 8GBP and give 2GBP to the 
responder. Responders always accepted even splits, whereas 2GBP offers were accepted 
56.7% of the time. The very few offers giving more than 5GBP to the responder were 
always accepted and the few offers giving nothing to the responder were always 
rejected. We therefore focused our analysis on responses to an offer of 2GBP.  
 
Aggressive mood and ultimatum responses  
 
As depicted in Fig. 1b, the self-reported mood scale administered prior to the task 
(Norris, 1971) indicates that feeling aggressive was a significant predictor of 2GBP 
ultimatum offer rejections (t(37)= 2.43, p = 0.020, fixed-effects linear regression, F(16, 
37) = 6.26, within-R2 = 0.299). The partial 2 of aggressiveness is 0.075 and the 
standardized coefficient of the estimated regression is 0.20 (+1 SD in aggressiveness is 
associated with a 0.20 increase in the probability of rejection, 95% C.I. = [0.027, 0.37]), 
indicating that the correlation is fairly strong (see also Fig. 1b). This supports our 
hypothesis that rejections of low offers are a valid behavioral measure of an individual’s 
inclination towards non-physical aggression.5 
  
Mood and T administration 
 
In the T condition, participants reported feeling more energetic (Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test, z = 2.379, p = 0.017) and interested (z = 2.052, p = 0.040), but not more aggressive 
(z = -0.587, p = 0.6, see Fig. 1c). This evidence is consistent with a previous placebo-
controlled crossover study investigating the effects of sustained T elevations on mood, 
aggression and sexual behavior in young men, in which the only significant effect 
throughout the treatment duration was a reduction in self-reported fatigue (O’Connor et 
al, 2004). 
 
T administration and ultimatum rejections 
 
As shown in Fig. 2a, the proportion of 2GBP offers rejected was similar under both 
conditions: 43.4% under placebo and 43.2% under T. Of the entire group, 24 subjects 
did not change their responses across treatments, 6 subjects switched from accepting in 
the placebo treatment to rejecting in the T treatment, and 7 subjects switched from 
rejecting in the placebo treatment to accepting in the T treatment. An exact McNemar 
test, appropriate for paired binary outcomes, clearly fails to reject the null hypothesis 
(χ2 = 0.08, p = 1.000). A differences-in-differences test between the ‘placebo-then-
treatment’ group and the ‘treatment-then-placebo’ group also clearly fails to reject the 
null hypothesis (z = -0.161, p = 0.9, Mann-Whitney U test, see Fig. 2b). Thus, we do not 
find any evidence that T increased the overall likelihood of rejection of low ultimatum 
game offers. 
 
Although our sample size is substantially larger than most other within-subjects studies 
reporting behavioral effects of T administration (Bos et al, 2012), it is possible that our 
null findings may have been caused by insufficient power. Given that only 13 out of 38 
(34%) of our subjects changed their behavior between conditions, post hoc analysis 
                                                        
5 Of course, other factors such as other-regarding preferences or fairness considerations may also 
help to explain rejections of low ultimatum offers (Güth and Kocher, 2014). 
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shows that our power to detect a small, medium and large effect (odds ratios of 1.5, 3.5 
and 9.0, respectively) with a one-tailed McNemar test is 0.17, 0.68 and 0.97, respectively 
(G*Power, Faul et al, 2007). 
 
To quantify the informativeness of our null result, we estimated the 90% confidence 
interval of the previous exact McNemar test. The interval ranges from an odds ratio (OR) 
of 0.40 to 3.47. This implies that, with p < 0.05, we can reject an effect of T on the 
propensity to reject 2GBP offers of medium or larger size (OR ≥ 3.5). Alternatively, 
Bayes factors can be computed to estimate the odds that the null model is correct 
relative to alternative models that assume a positive treatment effect. Basing our prior 
on the positive correlations between basal T and rejection rates reported in earlier 
studies (Burnham, 2007; Mehta and Beer, 2010), our evidence yields Bayes factors 
ranging from 4.84 to 28.29, which, according to commonly used evidence categories, 
constitute substantial and strong evidence in favor of the null model, respectively (see 
supplementary information).  
 
Beliefs and baseline T 
 
A previous administration study reported that beliefs about having received T or 
placebo were significantly correlated with proposer offers in the ultimatum game 
(Eisenegger et al, 2010). In our data, beliefs had no significant effect on rejection rates 
(McNemar’s χ2 = 0.33, p = 0.774). Controlling for beliefs, T treatment continued to have 
no significant effect on rejections (fixed-effects linear regression F(2, 35) = 0.49, within-
R2 = 0.02, average T effect = 0.02, 95% C.I. = (-0.15, 0.18), t(35)= 0.2, p = 0.8, see 
supplementary information).  
Evidence of a positive correlation between baseline T levels and low offer rejections was 
found in two previous studies (Burnham, 2007; Mehta and Beer, 2010). We reproduced 
their analysis using responses in the placebo condition and found no significant 
difference in (log) baseline T levels between subjects who accepted 2GBP offers, and 
those who rejected them, although the difference was in the same direction as the 
previous reports (t(30) = 0.26, one-sided p = 0.4, d = 0.10, 95% C.I. = (-0.67, 0.86)). We 
repeated the analysis using placebo data from the first session only (N = 18) and 
continued to find no effect (t(16) = 0.60, one-sided p = 0.3, d = 0.31, 95% C.I. = (-0.77, 
1.38)). Finally, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between baseline T and 
rejections in this subgroup was positive but insignificant ((18) = 0.25, p = 0.3). The 
discrepancy in our findings, however, could be due to the fact that our experiment was 
designed for within-subject comparisons. In particular, although each subject was tested 
at the same time of the day on both weeks, the times varied across subjects. Given that 
testosterone exhibits a marked diurnal cycle, this may have severely reduced our power 
to detect significant correlations between behavior and baseline T. 
Discussion 
 
Extensive evidence indicates that T is correlated with dominant behaviors aimed at 
asserting one’s social status, often in the form of physical or non-physical aggression 
(Archer, 1991, 2006; Mazur and Booth, 1998; Book et al, 2001). In the context of the 
ultimatum game, the rejection of an unequal offer favoring the proposer has been 
interpreted as a form of non-physical aggression in response to social provocation 
(Burnham, 2007; Mehta and Beer, 2010). Thus, it is natural to formulate the hypothesis 
that elevated T will increase the probability of rejecting such offers.  
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Contrary to our hypothesis, we did not observe significant changes in responder 
behavior in healthy young men receiving T, compared to placebo. Controlling for beliefs 
about having received T or placebo did not change the interpretation of the data. Our 
analysis of subjects’ mood prior to participation in the ultimatum game also indicates 
that T administration did not affect aggressiveness, which was a key predictor of 
ultimatum rejections. Therefore, T administration did not appear to promote mood 
states conducive to ultimatum rejections. 
 
Although our study relied on a larger sample size than most previous within-subjects T 
administration studies (Bos et al, 2012), a post hoc power analysis shows that our study 
is only well-powered to detect medium to large effects. Furthermore, potential learning 
effects and the fact that washout duration may have been insufficient to fully restore T 
levels back to baseline in all participants may have also reduced our ability to detect a 
behavioral effect of T. On the other hand, our null result turns out to be quite 
informative: Bayes factors derived from our results indicate substantial support for the 
null hypothesis, whereas estimated confidence intervals rule out medium or larger 
effects of T on the probability of rejection (OR ≥ 3.5) at the 5% level.  
 
It is unlikely that our null findings are due to a low sensitivity of the behavioral task. 
Crockett et al (2008) employed a similar within-subjects design and observed 
significant changes in ultimatum responses after acute tryptophan depletion. 
Furthermore, previous evidence shows that responder behavior in the ultimatum game 
is sensitive to subtle experimental manipulations. For example, imposing a 10 min 
cooling-off period before subjects can respond or allowing them to attach messages to 
their decisions has been shown to dramatically increase acceptance rates of low offers 
(Xiao and Houser, 2005; Grimm and Mengel, 2011). Even if our within-subjects design 
may have elicited less intra-subject variation in behavior than desirable, our evidence 
shows that a subject’s change in his aggressive mood from one week to the next 
correlated with changes in his behavior in the ultimatum game. This supports the 
validity of our task as a sensitive behavioral measure of changes in non-physical 
aggression. However, none of our tests suggest an effect of T in the hypothesized 
direction. In addition, our experimental protocol was successful in detecting a positive 
effect of T on self-reported energetic mood, consistent with earlier findings (O’Connor, 
2004). Similarly, the protocol induced substantial changes in financial risk-taking 
behavior in a separate task (Cueva et al, 2015). In particular, subjects increased their 
average investment in risky assets by 46% after T administration compared to placebo. 
Thus our experimental manipulation has been successful in modifying other forms of 
social and economic behavior.  
 
There are very few studies investigating causal effects of T on bargaining behavior. A 
previous between-subjects study with post-menopausal women found no effect of 4 
weeks of T treatment on various economic decisions including ultimatum acceptance 
thresholds (Zethraeus et al, 2009). Two other studies have administered T to 
participants in the ultimatum game with mixed evidence. The first study was a within-
subjects experiment conducted with men which found that T decreased generosity (Zak 
et al, 2009). However, their results are only significant when considering repeated 
observations from each subject (N = 25) as statistically independent. Moreover, proposer 
behavior is difficult to interpret because it is likely based on the beliefs that the 
proposer holds regarding the responder’s attitude to low offers. T could therefore 
induce lower offers through an increase in the tolerance to the risk of rejection. Indeed, 
this interpretation is supported by our recent findings regarding T and financial risk-
taking (Cueva et al, 2015). Zak et al did not observe a significant effect of T on rejection 
thresholds. However, there are two important limitations with their evidence. Firstly, 
subjects stated their full strategies both as proposers and as responders at the start of 
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the game and before roles were assigned. Previous studies suggest that this method of 
elicitation (called the strategy method) and role uncertainty can have a large impact on 
behavior (Casari and Cason, 2009; Iriberri and Rey-Biel, 2010). Therefore, one cannot 
rule out that the potential effects of T might dissipate when the ultimatum game is 
played in this more indirect form, where subjects are invited to consider both roles in 
the game and specify responses to hypothetical offers. Secondly, subjects were aware of 
the fact that other participants were making offers after receiving T. Players’ intentions 
and their degree of control over their actions are known to have important effects on 
fairness considerations and on subjects’ responses to these actions (Falk et al, 2008). 
For this reason, folk wisdom about the effects of T on antisocial behavior (Eisenegger et 
al, 2010) may have easily affected responders’ attitudes towards low ultimatum offers. 
 
The second study administering T to subjects in an ultimatum game was a between-
subjects experiment conducted with women which found that T increased proposer 
offers (Eisenegger et al, 2010). In this case, their results were only significant after 
controlling for beliefs about being in the placebo or T condition. They also did not 
observe an effect of T on responder rejections. The authors argue that an increase in fair 
offers and a null effect on responder behavior is consistent with the hypothesis that T 
promotes actions aimed at maintaining social status. The same hypothesis, however, 
may bring different predictions for men, since the relationship between behavior and 
social status is likely to be gender-specific. For instance, women cooperate more in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game while being observed by their peer group whereas men 
cooperate less (Charness and Rustichini, 2011), suggesting important gender 
differences in the relationship between social status and cooperation. 
 
A recent study implemented the PSAP in a between-subjects single T administration 
protocol with healthy men and found an overall insignificant effect of T on PSAP 
responses (Carré et al, 2016). Interestingly, a significant positive effect of T on point 
subtractions was found in subjects with high trait dominance or high trait self-control. 
Unfortunately, this study was not available until after our data collection phase so we 
were not able to test whether their findings would carry through in our protocol. 
 
There are potentially other relevant interactions with T treatment that we were unable 
to examine. For instance, a positive association between T and dominance or 
competition may only be present in individuals with low basal levels of cortisol (Mehta 
and Josephs, 2010). Another factor that we were unable to investigate is the influence of 
genetic differences on an individual’s sensitivity to T. For instance, the length of a 
polymorphic CAG repeat sequence in the androgen receptor gene is known to be 
inversely related to the transcriptional activity of the androgen receptor (Chamberlain 
et al, 1994). Finally, we must be cautious not to assume that our treatment exclusively 
affected T levels, since it may have also produced negative feedback effects on HPG axis 
activity. 
 
The fact that we found no effect of T in this study does not rule out a T-dominance or T-
aggression relationship. Numerous studies have found significant correlations between 
circulating T and various forms of dominant or aggressive behavior (Archer, 1991, 
2006; Mazur and Booth, 1998; Book et al, 2001; Eisenegger et al, 2011; van Honk et al, 
2014). One possibility is that high basal T, rather than variations in its circulating level, 
is a biological marker of stable individual differences in personality (Sellers et al, 2007). 
Another possibility is that dominance and high social status promote elevated T, rather 
than the other way around. Indeed, there is broad causal evidence that competition and 
dominance increases T but little support for the reverse effect (Archer, 2006). Finally, it 
is also possible that a different task involving greater social contact could elicit an effect 
of T on aggression or dominance. Indeed, the effects of T on behavior may be tailored for 
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social interaction (Bos et al, 2012), and our minimal social contact setting may have 
suppressed these effects. Notwithstanding these considerations, our evidence adds 
further support to the view that T administration does not promote aggressive, 
dominant or even status-seeking behavior in healthy young men.  
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Figure 1. (A) Mean salivary testosterone concentrations (± 1 SE) in the placebo and 
testosterone treatments. Subjects received 3 daily consecutive doses of testosterone or 
placebo each week. Saliva was assayed immediately before the first and last dose (0h 
and 48h). Behavioral testing took place at 49h. (B) Aggressive mood and ultimatum 
responses to unfavorable offers. Subjects who were more likely to reject 2GBP offers in 
week 2 than in week 1 were also feeling more aggressive in week 2 than in week 1, 
according to their responses to the visual analogue mood scale (t = 2.43, p = 0.020, see 
table S2). (C) Testosterone treatment and aggressive mood. Subjects did not report 
feeling more aggressive in the testosterone condition than in the placebo condition (z = -
0.587, p = 0.6, see table S3). 
 
Figure 2. (A) Testosterone treatment and proportion of unfavorable offers accepted. 
Subjects were not significantly more likely to accept 2GBP offers in the placebo 
condition than in the testosterone condition (McNemar’s, χ2 = 0.08, exact significance p = 
1.000). (B) Treatment order had no effect on the proportion of unfavorable offers 
accepted in each week (z = -0.161, p = 0.9).  
 
 
Supplementary information 
Supplementary information accompanies this paper at http://www... (available upon 
publication) 
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Figure 2 
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Highlights 
 41 healthy young men receive T or placebo in a within-subjects double-
blind design 
 Subjects respond to unfavorable offers in an incentivized ultimatum game 
 Other measures include self-reported mood and baseline T 
 Aggressive mood predicts ultimatum game rejections 
 T increases energetic mood but not aggressiveness or ultimatum game 
rejections 
